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I. INTRODUCTION
Does being pregnant when you commit a crime make you more
culpable than someone who is not pregnant? Accordingly to new and
frightening precedent, the answer is yes. In July 2014, a District Court
judge decided that Lacey Weld, a Tennessee woman, “should face a
longer prison sentence because she was pregnant at the time she was
involved in a [methamphetamine (“meth”)] manufacturing operation.”1
* J.D. Candidate, Florida State University College of Law 2016. Special thanks to
Sam Wiseman for his support.
1
Katie McDonough, Federal Judge: Pregnancy Can Be Grounds for Enhanced
Criminal Penalties, SALON (July 15, 2014),
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/15/tennessee_woman_may_face_a_double_prison_se
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The judge “elect[ed] to impose an enhanced sentence on the grounds
of child endangerment.”2 He cited “substantial risk of harm to a
minor” to justify the enhanced sentence.3 U.S. Attorney William C.
Killian issued a statement indicating that the precedent will guide
future sentencing, citing a “tragic rise” in the number of drug-addicted
babies, and saying that “[t]hrough this prosecution, the U.S. Attorney’s
Office sends a message that, should a child, born or unborn, be
exposed to a substantial risk of harm through the manufacture of
methamphetamine, we will pursue any available enhancements at
sentencing.”4
The question before the judge in United States v. Weld was
twofold: whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”)
involving child endangerment apply to fetuses, and whether “women
should be subject to a distinct set of laws by virtue of their
pregnancies.” 5 Judge Varlan answered both questions in the
affirmative.6 In this note, however, I argue that the decision in Weld
sets “a dangerous legal precedent for gender discriminatory laws, and
could establish de facto fetal personhood as a judicial fiat.”7
Following Judge Varlan’s opinion, Weld appealed to the
United State Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 8 The Sixth
Circuit, however, granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss,
effectively affirming Judge Varlan’s decision.9 As a result of this
case, there are now: (1) separate and unequal laws that apply to
women from the moment they carry a fertilized egg; (2) crimes that
exist for pregnant women only; and (3) women that are subject to
doubly punitive laws.10
Although the debate regarding drug-addicted criminals
culminated in the 1980s and early 1990s with the “crack baby”
hysteria, the debate is now rearing its ugly head again through
ntence_simply_because_she_was_pregnant/; see also United States v. Weld, 619 F.
App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2015).
2
McDonough, supra note 1.
3
Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years in Prison for Conspiracy to
Manufacture Methamphetamine: Manufacturing and Smoking Methamphetamine
While Pregnant Results in Enhanced Sentence, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 15, 2014)
[hereinafter Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years],
http://www.justice.gov/usao/tne/news/2014/July/071514%20Weld%20Sentencing%
20Meth.html.
4
Id.
5
McDonough, supra note 1; see also Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513.
6
McDonough, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513.
9
Id.
10
McDonough, supra note 1 (reporting remarks from Lynn Paltrow, executive
director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women).
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sentencing decisions. 11 “States have primarily used child abuse,
neglect, endangerment, controlled substance, homicide, and
manslaughter statutes to punish pregnant drug-addicted women for
allegedly exposing their fetuses to potential harm.”12 But using these
enhancements to punish pregnant drug-addicted women is simply bad
policy. States argue that “these prosecutions are to protect the fetus
from abuse and to deter women from using drugs during pregnancy”;
however, instead of providing mothers with much-needed drug
treatment, the prosecutorial strategy results in sending “a considerable
number of women to prison.”13
This note explores how laws criminalizing pregnant women
have developed and argues that recent sentencing decisions violate
women’s rights and are dangerous to society. It presents non-judicial
remedies, such as treatment and early-intervention, as solutions to
handle the problem of pregnant drug-addicted women and drugexposed newborns.
While likely constitutional due to state interest in health and
public safety, and the lack of explicit targeting of suspect classes, these
sentencing decisions nonetheless implicate constitutional concerns,
impact abortion rights, and are a poor interpretation of the Guidelines.
This note, therefore, argues that Weld’s sentence was excessively
punitive because fetuses are not people or “minors” under the
Guidelines, and even if they were, the harm to a drug-exposed fetus is
not so severe as to warrant the use of the “substantial risk of harm to a
minor” enhancement.14 Thus, the Weld decision should be reversed,
and child endangerment enhancements should be prohibited for
pregnant drug-addicted women.
II. LACEY WELD: A CASE STUDY
Lacey Weld (“Weld”), a twenty-six-year-old woman, “was
picked up in an undercover sting at a meth[] manufacturing plant” in
rural Jefferson County, Tennessee.15 Weld cooperated in the case and
11

See generally Michael Winerip, Revisiting the “Crack Babies” Epidemic That Was
Not, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/booming/revisiting-the-crack-babies-epidemicthat-was-not.html?_r=0 (describing the 1980’s hysteria that revolved around
“predictions that a generation of children would be damaged for life” because of the
use of crack cocaine).
12
Tiffany Lyttle, Stop the Injustice: A Protest Against the Unconstitutional
Punishment of Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
781, 783 (2006).
13
Id. at 781-82.
14
Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513.
15
Amanda Marcotte, Tennessee Sentenced a Woman to Six Extra Years in Jail
Simply Because She Was Pregnant, SLATE (Oct. 13, 2014),
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testified against her co-defendants. 16 She pled guilty and “was
sentenced to more than 12 years in prison and five years of supervised
release for her involvement in meth manufacturing.”17 Judge Varlan,
who decided the case for the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, used the Guidelines’ enhancements to
tack on an additional six years because Weld was pregnant at the time
of her arrest.18
The question in Weld’s case was not about adding additional
charges because she was pregnant, but rather whether the court should
enhance her sentence for crimes to which she already pled guilty.19
Ultimately, Judge Varlan enhanced Weld’s sentence for putting her
unborn child at a substantial risk of harm.20 However, Weld was not
convicted for smoking meth; she pled guilty for conspiracy to
manufacture meth.21 The Department of Justice nevertheless justified
the penalty, in part, because Weld had “apparently used
methamphetamine while pregnant.”22 But “[d]rug use . . . is not a
crime under either Tennessee or federal law.”23 Therefore, imposing
“criminal sanctions for using meth, a non-existent crime, violates clear
due process principles and prohibitions on ex post facto laws.”24
Here, “Weld was convicted of manufacturing, not possession
of, methamphetamine.” 25
“Tennessee law allows sentence
enhancements if the victim is especially vulnerable, but Weld was not
convicted of victimizing her son. Those six extra years were for a
crime that isn’t a crime in Tennessee at all.”26 Unarguably, “Weld’s
son was born sick and . . . ‘tested positive for opioids and meth[].’”27
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/13/lacey_weld_case_tennessee_wom
an_gets_six_extra_years_in_prison_for_being.html; see also Kristen Gwynne, A
Woman Got Six Extra Years In Prison Because She Was Pregnant, VICE (Oct. 10,
2014), http://www.vice.com/read/a-woman-got-six-extra-years-in-prison-becauseshe-was-pregnant-1010.
16
Gwynne, supra note 15.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513.
20
Id.
21
Id.; see also Marcotte, supra note 15.
22
Marcotte, supra note 15.
23
Id. (quoting Letter from Lynn M. Paltrow, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Advocates for
Pregnant Women, to Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 7,
2014) [hereinafter Letter from Lynn M. Paltrow],
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/DOJ%20Weld%20Letter%20%20signed.pdf).
24
Letter from Lynn M. Paltrow, supra note 23 (emphasis in original).
25
Marcotte, supra note 15.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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Afterwards, Weld expressly accepted “responsibility for exposing her
son to drugs in utero, telling the court, ‘He could have died, and I just
pray and thank God that my sister has him and he’s OK.’”28
However, many things can cause harm to a fetus in utero,
including consumption of caffeine or alcohol, using tobacco, and even
lack of sleep or too much exercise.29 Accordingly, Weld’s defense
attorney, John Eldridge, said, “There’s no proof as to what caused the
withdrawal. There was drug use, and there was exposure in a meth lab
. . . [Testimony] just said opioids and meth were in the baby’s system,
so the judge concluded that it was meth exposure [which caused
withdrawal symptoms]. I think it’s opioids.”30
Generally, the law does not punish women for behaving badly
while pregnant. 31 These sentence enhancements, however, are
criminalizing otherwise non-criminal acts for pregnant women.32 In
Weld’s case, she received an enhanced sentence because she took part
in an unhealthy, but not illegal, activity while pregnant.33 Allowing
punishment for legal, albeit unhealthy, choices opens the door to all
types of paternalistic “policing of pregnant women’s behavior.”34
Eldridge also reported that he did not believe that “this
particular [sentencing] enhancement was ever designed for pregnant
women.”35 Eldridge believed that the law was “intended to prevent
‘substantial risk of harm to life of a minor or an incompetent’ [and]
do[es] not mention harm to a fetus.”36 While there is no “civil right to
be pregnant in a meth lab,” pregnant women have the right to be
treated the same as those who are not pregnant in the criminal justice
system.37
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH PUNISHING PREGNANT DRUG-ADDICTED
WOMEN FOR HARM TO A FETUS
The act of punishing pregnant drug-addicted mothers has faced
harsh criticism, and for good reason. In addition to implicating
28

Id.
Id.; see also Gwynne, supra note 15. See generally Int’l Union v. Johnson
Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 914 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting
that an estimated 15 to 20 million jobs entail exposure to chemicals that pose fetal
risk).
30
Gwynne, supra note 15.
31
Marcotte, supra note 15; Gwynne, supra note 15.
32
Marcotte, supra note 15.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Gwynne, supra note 15.
36
Id.
37
Id.
29
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constitutional rights and misunderstanding medical science,
criminalizing pregnancy has been criticized as a mechanism for
enforcing racial oppression deeply rooted in the tragic practice of
slavery.38
A. Bad Policy
The tragedy of drug-exposed babies is initially a tragedy of
drug-addicted mothers. 39 “Both are part of a larger tragedy of a
community that is suffering a host of indignities, including,
significantly, the denial of equal respect for its women’s reproductive
decisions.”40 “[T]he punishment of drug addicts who chose to carry
their pregnancies to term violates their constitutional rights to equal
protection and privacy regarding their reproductive choices.”41 Using
child endangerment sentence enhancements not only conflicts with
constitutional concerns, but also fails to properly protect fetal health,
as demonstrated below.
“Poor crack addicts are punished for having babies because
they fail to measure up to the state’s ideal of motherhood.”42 This is
best illustrated in cases where prosecutors charge women who use
drugs during pregnancy without demonstrating harm to the fetus.43
For example, in Johnson v. State, the prosecution failed to introduce
evidence that the children involved were adversely affected by their
mother’s crack use.44 The opining judge noted that the “birth was
normal with no complications,” and that “[t]here was no evidence of
fetal distress either within the womb or during the delivery.”45
Beyond that, when the primary effect of a government policy is
punishing poor, predominately black women having babies, a shadow
of racial eugenics is evoked, “especially in light of the history of
sterilization abuse of women of color.”46 Arguably, these women are
38

Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1481 (1991).
39
See id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1419.
42
See id. at 1472.
43
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290-91 (Fla. 1992) (attempting to
prosecute a mother “delivery of a controlled substance to the infant during the thirty
to ninety seconds following the infant’s birth, but before the umbilical cord is
severed”).
44
Id. at 1291.
45
Id.
46
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1472; see also Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy:
Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1252 (2012) (“[T]he reproductive capacities of Black women have historically
served as a primary site for punishment within the criminal justice system. The
intersection of race and gender in the lives of women of color, and Black women in
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punished because they are seen as unfit to bear children due to their
poverty, race, and drug addiction.47 Yet, it is fundamentally held that:
The right to bear children goes to the heart of what it
means to be human. The value we place on individuals
determines whether we see them as entitled to
perpetuate themselves in their children. Denying a
woman the right to bear children—or punishing her for
exercising that right—deprives her of a basic part of her
humanity.48
Protecting fetuses is a valuable government motive; however,
enforcing unduly punitive measures against mothers is not a
productive way to ensure fetal health.49 While fetal exposure to meth
or other drugs is certainly not desirable, it is not detrimental enough to
the health and development of the fetus to merit such punishments of
the mother.50 The narrative of “meth babies” that seems to be driving
much of this prosecution is based more on hysteria than fact.51
In 2005, addiction specialists and medical associations released
a letter calling for responsible and accurate reporting on the issue
“based on science, not presumption or prejudice.”52
The use of stigmatizing terms, such as “ice babies” and
“meth babies,” [the doctors explained,] lack scientific
validity and should not be used. Experience [has
demonstrated] that similar labels applied to children
exposed . . . to cocaine . . . [has resulted in] lower[ed]
expectations for their academic and life achievements,
[has] discourag[ed] investigation into other causes for
particular, render them vulnerable to a host of ideological constructions—including
sexual promiscuity and bad mothering—that portray them as lacking fundamental
aspects of feminine gender identity. Because of these failings, women who have
been criminalized or incarcerated are later subjected to punishments that involve the
prevention or punishment of their choice to reproduce, often as a formal part of their
sentences.”) (citation omitted).
47
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1472.
48
Id. (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1977)).
49
See generally id. at 1430 (explaining that “[t]he response of state prosecutors,
legislators, and judges to the
problem of drug-exposed babies has been punitive,” rather than preventative).
50
See id. at 1430-32.
51
See Letter from Doctors, Scientists, & Specialists Urging Major Media Outlets Not
to Create “Meth Baby” Myth (July 25, 2014) [hereinafter Letter from Doctors,
Scientists, & Specialists],
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/%2522Meth%2522%20Open%20Letter%20%202005.pdf.
52
Id.
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their possible physical and social problems . . . , and
lead[] to policies that ignore factors [like] poverty that
may[] play a much more significant role in their lives.53
By definition, babies cannot be addicted to meth or any other
drugs.54 “Addiction is a technical term . . . refer[ring] to compulsive
behavior that continues . . . [de]spite adverse consequences.”55 As
described in the letter, “[i]n utero physiologic dependence on opiates
(not addiction), known as Neonatal Narcotic Abstinence Syndrome, is
readily diagnosable and treatable, but no such symptoms have been
found to occur following prenatal cocaine or methamphetamine
exposure.”56
Medical professionals have warned that the spread of false
information results in “punitive civil and child welfare interventions
that are harmful to women, children and families rather than in the
ongoing research and improvement and provision of treatment services
that are so clearly needed.”57 Here, the most productive solution to
promoting health is not to break up families by means of incarceration,
but rather to preserve the family by helping women achieve sobriety
and become responsible mothers.
In 1990, “[t]he American Academy of Pediatric’s [(“AAP”)]
Committee on Substance Abuse . . . adopted a policy statement that
‘punitive measures taken toward pregnant women, such as criminal
prosecutions and incarceration, have no proven benefits for infant
health.’”58 Women in prison are taken from their families and receive
few resources to overcome addiction. Additionally, female prisoners
are not afforded the opportunity to refine their parenting skills. “The
AAP is concerned that such involuntary measures may discourage
mothers and their infants from receiving the very medical care and
social support systems that are crucial to their treatment.”59 If society
is concerned about fetal health and the development of healthy
citizens,
then
incarcerating
drug-addicted
mothers
is
counterproductive.
Even if imposing enhanced sentences on drug-addicted
mothers furthered state interests in child welfare, enhanced sentences
53

Id.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Letter from Doctors, Scientists, & Specialists, supra note 51.
58
Carol S. Larson, Overview of State Legislative and Judicial Responses, 1 FUTURE
CHILD. 72, 80 (1991) (citing American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee On
Substance Abuse, Drug-Exposed Infants, J. PEDIATRICS (Oct. 4, 1990)),
https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/01_01_06.pdf.
59
Id. at 80 n.49.
54
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would surely fail the “least restrictive alternative” standard, which
dictates that, “even though the governmental purpose [may] be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved.”60 Currently, these enhanced sentences are
disrupting families, failing to provide support and resources for
women, and even deterring healthy pregnancies and encouraging the
termination of pregnancy.61 If becoming pregnant while addicted to
drugs subjects a woman to enhanced sentences, it affects her decision
to become a mother. It infringes on her liberty as a woman. So what
is the least restrictive alternative to further state interests in child
welfare? The problem of drug-exposed babies is best addressed
through adequate prenatal care for poor women and drug treatment
programs that meet the needs of pregnant drug-addicted women.62
As the experiences of slavery,63 the War on Drugs, and current
events have taught us, government control of pregnancy punishes
women for having babies, perpetuates the notion that a woman’s value
is determined exclusively by her ability to procreate, and deems the
poor, black, and drug-addicted as unworthy of the dignity of
childbearing.64 Arguably, the government is better suited to make
decisions about fetal care than a drug-addicted mother. However,
allowing the government to determine who is entitled to be a mother is
a wholly separate matter. State interference in the decision to have
children is more constitutionally significant than control of lifestyle
60

Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 789-91.
62
Id. at 789.
63
See Ocen, supra note 46, at 1267-68 (citing DARLENE CLARK HINE, Female Slave
Resistance: The Economics of Sex, in HINE SIGHT: BLACK WOMEN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1994)). According to Ocen:
[A]ttempts to resist sexual exploitation and domination contributed
to the characterization of Black women as bad mothers. . . . Black
women often refused to bear children who were conceived in acts
of violence or to raise their children in a state of bondage. The
white slaveholding class, however, interpreted this resistance as
evidence of Black women’s status as degenerate mothers. . . .
[O]ne Southern physician suggested that all doctors in Hancock
County, Georgia, were “aware of the frequent complaints of
planters about the unnatural tendency in the African female
population to destroy her offspring.”
Id. at 1267. This construction of Black women as bad mothers endured beyond
slavery and supported a new system of racial subordination in which Black women
continued to be exploited through the state’s policing of crime. Id. A new
construction of the Black woman as an inherently dangerous and morally corrupt
criminal appeared in post-slavery America. Id. at 1268-69.
64
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1472-76.
61
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choices.65 Moreover, the lack of access to safe abortions and other
resources necessary for healthy pregnancies and parenthood limit the
reproductive freedom of many women, and disproportionately affect
poor women of color.66 The government both directly interferes with
their decisions and fails to facilitate them.67
Clearly, enhancing the sentences of pregnant drug-addicted
women is bad policy. First, it is medically unclear how much harm
fetuses endure.
Second, the marginal deterrence benefit of
incarceration is outweighed by the harm incarceration causes to
women and families. Lastly, these sentence enhancements are
discriminatory and conflict with abortion and other constitutional
rights.
B. Equal Protection
“While officials are calling [Weld] the first case of its kind,
criminalizing women based on their pregnancies is hardly a new
phenomenon.” 68 “Between 1973 and 2005, there were 413
documented cases in which a woman’s pregnancy was a necessary
factor in the criminal charges brought against her by the state.”69 In
addition to those 413 cases, the National Advocates for Pregnant
Women (“NAPW”) “has identified 350 other cases in the last decade
in which a woman’s pregnancy was a determining factor in her
prosecution or detention.” 70 The judiciary is reading into the
Guidelines the ability to enforce punitive sentences based on a
degraded notion of the drug-addict, ruling as if it is their paternal
responsibility to punish drug-addicted mothers for their choice to
procreate.
i.
Gender
The “criminalization of maternal substance abuse singles out
women for punishment.”71 No similar or equal law exists for men.72
65

See, e.g., Lyttle, supra note 12, at 789 (arguing that “states’ prosecutorial
strategies [for prosecuting drug-addicted mothers] violate the constitutional
guarantees to due process, equal protection, and right to privacy”).
66
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1461-62.
67
Id. at 1461. “One of the most significant obstacles to receiving prenatal care is the
inability to pay for health care services. . . . Institutional, cultural, and educational
barriers also deter poor women of color from using the few available services.” Id.
at 1447 n.144.
68
McDonough, supra note 1; see also Gwynne, supra note 15 (“Weld’s sentencing
hike on the basis of her pregnancy was ‘unique.’”).
69
McDonough, supra note 1; see also Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Arrests of
and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005:
Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 299, 299-300 (2013).
70
McDonough, supra note 1.
71
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793.
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Men who give pregnant women drugs and help conceive children are
not prosecuted for the harm they cause, despite “studies which suggest
that the sperm of male substance abusers can lead to health risks for
the fetus.”73 “A pregnant drug-addicted woman who gives birth to a
healthy baby, however, may still be charged under various criminal
statutes for exposing her fetus to ‘harm.’”74 This indicates that there
are special gender discriminatory laws in place that penalize women
for a condition—pregnancy. In many of these cases, women were
deprived of basic constitutional rights of due process, and even right to
legal counsel, because they were pregnant. 75 This “differential,
gender-based treatment is discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.”76
The problem with this argument “under the Equal Protection
Clause is that in some situations, pregnancy-based classifications may
only receive deferential rational basis review.”77 “Although genderbased classifications are subject to heightened, intermediate scrutiny,
pregnancy-based classifications are not necessarily gender-based
classifications and thus do not necessarily receive this same high level
of scrutiny.” 78 It is incomprehensible how pregnancy-based
classifications are not gender-based classifications, since, despite our
most modern medical advances, men still cannot become pregnant.
However, “[u]nder the rational basis test, the State only has to
demonstrate that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest,”79 so an “equal protection attack premised on sex
72

Id. (“State prosecutors do not punish the men who help conceive the children and
who give pregnant women drugs . . . .”).
73
Id. (citing Julia E. Jones, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REV. 1159,
1166-67 (1992)).
74
Id.
75
See Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 69, at 305-09 (summarizing cases “that illustrate
some of the varied circumstances in which pregnant women have been deprived of
their liberty, the different legal mechanisms used to do that, and some of the
consequences of those deprivations”).
76
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793; see also id. at 793 n.93 (citing Michelle Oberman,
Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women
Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 527-31 (1992) (concluding that a Minnesota
law regarding the reporting of prenatal exposure to controlled substances would fail
intermediate scrutiny, given that the government interest in pre-viable fetal life is not
sufficient to permit state regulation of mothers’ bodies)).
77
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793; see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97
(1974).
78
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 793; see also Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (“While it is
true that only woman can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . .”).
79
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 794; see also Louise M. Chan, S.O.S. From the Womb: A
Call for New York Legislation Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 224 (1993).
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discrimination” would likely not prohibit the prosecution of drugaddicted pregnant women.80
ii.
Race
Many studies indicate that white and African-American women
use drugs during pregnancy at similar rates.81 However, “another
study indicates that a pregnant African-American woman is almost ten
times more likely than a pregnant white woman to be reported to
health authorities for drug use.” 82 “This gross racial disparity in
reporting and the subsequent prosecution and sentencing of drugaddicted women leads . . . to a belie[f] that [there is] a discriminatory
purpose motivat[ing] state prosecutors’ desire to make maternal
substance abuse a crime.”83
However, “[s]uch disparities do not prove that the prosecutions
are unconstitutional . . . because the Supreme Court has interpreted
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause narrowly,”
requiring discriminatory intent in addition to a disparate impact.84 “It
is difficult to prove that the State, in its prosecutions for maternal
substance abuse, actually intended to discriminate against pregnant,
drug-addicted, African-American women.”85 In order to prove such
intent, “a litigant would most likely have to show evidence indicating a
pattern of disparate treatment that is unexplainable” on any other
grounds, “or is a departure from the normal procedures for bringing
charges against drug-addicted women.”86
While prosecuting pregnant-drug addicted women may not be
facially racially discriminatory, race is certainly implicated in the
prosecutions and subsequent sentencing of pregnant drug-addicted
women, as evidenced above, and should be considered in analyzing the
validity of the use of child endangerment enhancements.

80

Lyttle, supra note 12, at 794.
Id. (citing Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in America’s Drug
War: Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria Over Crack, 54 ALA. L.
REV. 665, 687 (2003)).
82
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 794-95 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory
Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990)).
83
Id. at 795.
84
Id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976).
85
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 795.
86
Id. at 795-96 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977) (discussing factors that are relevant to proving racially discriminatory
purpose, such as “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,” “[t]he
historical background of the decision,” “legislative or administrative history” of
official state actions, and “departures from the normal procedural sequence”)).
81

2016]

SENTENCING PREGNANT DRUG ADDICTS

81

C. Right to Privacy
Punishing women for having babies violates their
constitutional right to privacy for many reasons. First, it violates
women’s right to autonomy over their reproductive decisions. 87
Second, it creates a discriminatory government standard for
childbearing.88 Using the privacy doctrine to advocate for women is
useful because it emphasizes the value of personhood and protects
against abuse of government power.89
People who use illegal drugs are already subject to punishment
under an array of criminal laws in this country.90 “Pregnant women
are not exempt,” and they too can be prosecuted under these laws.91
However, punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their
pregnancies to term unconstitutionally burdens the right to autonomy
over their reproductive decisions as established in Roe v. Wade.92
In Roe, the [U.S.] Supreme Court held that the right to
privacy, “whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”93
By violating poor, predominately black women’s reproductive rights,
the government “perpetuate[s] a racist hierarchy in our society.”94
Thus, the “[p]rosecutions . . . impose a standard of motherhood that is
offensive to both principles of equality and privacy.”95
“[A] woman does not lose her right to privacy simply because
she becomes pregnant.”96 Pregnant women remain persons under the
Constitution, and the “constitutional right to privacy ‘extends to both
women and men, regardless of their biological differences.’”97 For
these reasons, “[s]tates’ mechanisms [for punishing drug-addicted
87

Roberts, supra note 38, at 1463, 1468.
Id. at 1463-64; see also Lyttle, supra note 12, at 797.
89
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1468.
90
Larson, supra note 58, at 74.
91
Id.
92
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796.
93
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
94
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1425.
95
Id.
96
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796.
97
Id. (quoting Deanna R. Reitman, Note, The Collision Between the Rights of
Women, the Rights of the Fetus and the Rights of the State: A Critical Analysis of the
Criminal Prosecution of Drug Addicted Pregnant Women, 16 ST. JOHN’S J.L COMM.
267, 302-03 (2002)).
88
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women]—prosecution by child abuse, endangerment, controlled
substance abuse, manslaughter, and homicide statutes—infringe upon
[their] . . . fundamental right to privacy because these mechanisms
punish [drug-addicted women] . . . simply for exercising [their] . . .
constitutional right to procreate.”98 Women have a “constitutional
right ‘to become pregnant and give birth despite drug dependence.’”99
“Punishing a woman for her behavior during pregnancy infringes upon
her personal autonomy,” her right to be “free from interference by
others, and . . . [her] ability to flourish among and in relation to
others.”100
Those who support enhanced sentences believe that a woman’s
freedom must be jeopardized in order to convince her to stop using
drugs or to enroll in a treatment program.101 Criminal prosecutions,
however, may do just the opposite.102 Fear of prosecution will deter
these women, who already lack many of the resources necessary for a
healthy pregnancy, “from seeking care, confiding in their doctors, and
participating in treatment.”103
There is a strong tie between abortion rights and criminalizing
dangerous behavior while pregnant. 104 The threat of enhanced
sentences weighs on a woman’s choice to have children, a strong
liberty and privacy interest.105 Women fearing criminal prosecution
for drug-abuse while pregnant are less likely to seek help or carry their
pregnancies to term. 106
“The states’ prosecutorial strategies
discourage pregnant drug-addicted women from seeking pre- and postnatal care because of fear.”107 This fear of punishment could force

98

Id.
Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Pub. Health Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant, People v. Gilligan (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (No. 2003-1192),
http://www.nyclu. Org/rrp_gilligan_amicus_110503.html).
100
Id. at 796-97 (citation omitted).
101
Larson, supra note 58, at 75, 80; see also Lyttle, supra note 12, at 786 (“Michigan
prosecutor Tony Tague argued that underlying the general deterrence objective of the
criminal prosecution of pregnant drug-addicted women is the hope that it will
encourage women to seek drug treatment.”).
102
Larson, supra note 58, at 80.
103
Id. (“Many of these opponents also believe that this deterrence will result from
automatically involving the child protective services agency when a pregnant woman
uses drugs.”).
104
See Lyttle, supra note 12, at 796-97.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 790.
107
Id. (citing Over 50 Public Health Organizations, Experts, and Related Advocates
Condemn the Prosecution of Pregnant Woman, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN (Oct. 30, 2003),
http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/pr_ltr_gilligan.htm).
99
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drug-addicted women to turn to abortion. 108 “[T]he government’s
[chief] response to the crisis of drug-exposed babies should be the
recognition of their mother’s worth and entitlement to autonomy over
their reproduction lives.”109 The proper solution to ensure healthy
babies, and therefore a healthy society, is a government committed to
“guaranteeing these fundamental rights of poor women . . . rather than
punishing them.”110
“The right to privacy argument . . . is limited by the State’s
interest in protecting the life of the unborn.”111 Indeed, “the right to
privacy is not absolute.”112 “It must be balanced against the State’s
interest in protecting the potential life that the pregnant drug-addicted
woman is carrying.”113 However, “there is rarely, if ever, a context in
which the State is justified in using the criminal justice system to
interfere with a woman’s child-bearing decisions.”114
D. Due Process
The Due Process Clause:
[R]equires that [w]hen an individual’s life, liberty or
property is to be curtailed by the government, that
individual must receive notice from the government,
which usually occurs through the publication of laws
passed by the legislature. The State violates the fair
notice requirement of due process when it fails to a
warn drug-addicted woman that her fetus will be treated
as a child or victim and that she will be . . . a criminal
offender for “harming” her fetus for purposes of child
abuse, neglect, endangerment, homicide, manslaughter,
and controlled substance abuse statutes.115

108
109

Id.

Roberts, supra note 38, at 1482.
Id.
111
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 797 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (“The woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from
the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later
point in fetal development the State’s interest in life has sufficient force so that the
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.”)).
112
Id.
113
Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“[A]t some point the state
interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become
dominant.”)).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Margaret Phillips, Comment,
Umbilical Cords: The New Drug Connection, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 540 (1992)).
110
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Women do “not have fair notice that child abuse, neglect,
endangerment, homicide, manslaughter, and controlled substance
statutes apply to [their] . . . maternal behavior’s potential, and actual,
effects on . . . [their] fetus[es].”116
The Due Process argument, however, is “weakened because
states have been prosecuting drug-addicted women for their behavior
during pregnancy since the late 1970s,” which makes it “difficult to
accept the claim that these women lack fair notice.”117 The “extensive
media coverage reporting on . . . babies exposed to drugs in the womb”
may also provide some degree of “notice that their behavior could
potentially harm their fetuses.”118 Still, women may not be aware that
the statutes written to protect children apply to fetuses.
IV. SENTENCING
Prosecutors and proponents of criminalizing drug-addicted
women believe that “severe punishments [will] act as disincentives for
women who are likely to engage in drug use . . . during pregnancy.”119
They claim “that the creation of crimes that punish women who
endanger their fetuses would educate the public through ‘the publicity
accompanying the trial, conviction, and sentencing’ of the ‘proper
distinctions between good and bad behavior.’”120 They “have sought
to accomplish . . . deterrence and the protection of potential life by
prosecuting drug-addicted women under an array of criminal
statutes.”121
Some mechanisms that prosecutors have used to prosecute
drug-addicted women are manslaughter and homicide statutes.122 “In
State v. McKnight, Regina McKnight, a twenty-two-year-old AfricanAmerican woman, was charged with homicide by child abuse after
experiencing a stillbirth.” 123 In McKnight’s case, “[t]he South
Carolina Supreme Court held that under South Carolina law, a viable
116

Id.
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 792.
118
Id. (citing Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is this
the Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1991) (explaining how the media’s
extensive coverage of the growing drug problem in United States, particularly among
pregnant women, has contributed to the public’s awareness of the effects of drug use
on fetuses)).
119
Id. at 786.
120
Id. (quoting Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Maternal
Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J.
357, 367 (1989)).
121
Id. at 787.
122
Id. at 788.
123
Lyttle, supra note 12, at 788 (citing State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171
(S.C. 2003)).
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fetus is a ‘child’ within the meaning of the child abuse statute.”124
While “prosecutors contend that punishing drug-addicted
women protects the potential fetal life from abuse and ensures the
fetus’s right to bodily integrity, . . . [t]he Supreme Court has held that
the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not
include the unborn.”125 The “unborn are therefore not entitled to
constitutional protection,” despite what prosecutors argue, when they
claim “that the fetus is a person entitled to legally recognized rights
such as bodily integrity and right to life.”126
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”),
establishing the United States Sentencing Commission.127 The SRA,
through the Sentencing Commission, was designed to:
Promulgate judicial federal sentencing guidelines,
establishing the “policies and practices” that would
“provide certainty and fairness in . . . sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities” between
like offenders guilty of like criminal conduct, while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to allow for
consideration of individual mitigating and aggravating
factors not taken into account by established general
sentencing practices.128
Congress had three main objectives in sentencing reform:
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality. 129 The first objective—
honesty—aimed at reducing the disparity between time sentenced and
time served, and eliminating confusion regarding how sentencing
decisions were made.130 The second objective—uniformity—hoped to
increase consistency “between the federal courts in sentencing like
offenders for like criminal conduct.” 131 The final objective—
proportionality—sought to sentence “defendants in a manner
124

Id. at 789 (citing McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 174-75).
Id. at 786-87 (citations omitted).
126
Id. at 787.
127
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2015) (“There is established as an independent commission in
the judicial branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission
which shall consist of seven voting members and one nonvoting member.”).
128
John Garry, Why Me: Application and Misapplication 3A1.1 the Vulnerable
Victim Enhancement of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
143, 148-49 (1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1988)).
129
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014).
130
Id.
131
Garry, supra note 128, at 150 (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A).
125
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consistent with the severity of their particular criminal conduct.”132
“The Commission identifies a rift between proponents . . . who call for
scaling punishment to the ‘offender’s culpability and resulting
harms,’” and opponents “who advocate the imposition of punishment
based on ‘practical crime control considerations.’”133
The Guidelines, promulgated by the Commission, “consider
the nature and seriousness of the offense, as well as the history and
characteristics of the defendant.” 134 The Guidelines also aim “to
promote respect for the law,” provide proportional punishment for
offenses, serve as an “adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,”
protect the public from future criminal activity, and provide
opportunities for rehabilitation.135 “Other goals of the SRA may be to
reduce the use of incarceration in sentencing,” when possible, “and
increase public confidence in the criminal justice system.”136 While
judges are required to consult the Guidelines during sentencing, the
Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. 137 Despite their advisory
nature, it remains important for judges “to keep this legislative intent
in mind when interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines.”138
In theory, the “application of the Guidelines is a mechanical
process.”139 The Guidelines Manual (“Manual”) provides judges with
general application principles.140 In reality, however, there is a great
deal of judicial discretion as the “judge identifies the component parts
that will yield the fully calculated sentence.”141
First, the judge must refer to “the statutory index, which crossreferences the federal statutes with guideline sections,” to determine
the applicable guideline section.142 The applicable guideline “provides
a base level offense, which, in turn, is adjusted by specific offense
characteristics.”143 The judge “then applies the various sections of
132

Id. (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A).
Id. (citations omitted).
134
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2015).
135
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see also Garry, supra note 128, at 149.
136
Rebecca L. Spiro, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Rehnquist Court:
Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 120-21 (2000)
(citation omitted).
137
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (establishing that the
Guidelines are “effectively advisory”). Justice Breyer, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
indicated that the sentencing judge must consider the guideline ranges, but is free “to
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.” Id. at 245-46.
138
Spiro, supra note 136, at 121.
139
Garry, supra note 128, at 151.
140
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014); see also Garry, supra note 128, at 151.
141
Garry, supra note 128, at 151.
142
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. app. A; U.S.S.G. § 1B1).
143
Id.
133
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Chapter Three of the . . . Manual to the base offense level.”144 These
“adjustments [are] for factors involving the characteristics of the
victims, the role that the defendant played in the offense, and any
obstruction of the proceedings by the defendant.”145 Lastly, the judge
“uses separate calculations to compute a sentencing range based on . . .
a sentencing table contained in Chapter Five.”146 The range considers
“probation, restitution, imprisonment, community confinement, and
fines.” 147 The judge may then decide whether “an upward or
downward departure is appropriate” and “sentence the defendant
within the calculated range.”148
Despite the Guidelines, there is great judicial discretion in
sentencing, which now rests on a reasonableness analysis. 149 In
Weld’s case, however, enhancing her sentence on the grounds of
“substantial risk of harm to a minor” because she was involved in the
manufacture of meth while pregnant, seems unreasonable.150 It does
not effectively further state interests in promoting fetal health, but
instead promulgates an excessively punitive system, restricts women’s
rights, and implicates constitutional concerns.
B. Gender and the Guidelines
While the Guidelines are supposed to remove gender as a
factor, it is clear that gender is a factor in many crimes, trials, and
sentencing decisions.151 Judge Varlan made Weld’s gender an issue
by enhancing her sentence with child endangerment and substantial
risk of harm to a minor enhancements as a result of her pregnancy.152
His gendered deviation from the Guidelines, however, did not have to
result in an upward departure. There were opportunities for downward
departures as well, including Section 5H1.6 “Family Ties and
144

Id. at 152.
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. §§ 3A1.1-3A1.3, 3B1.1-3B1.4, 3C1.1).
146
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A).
147
Garry, supra note 128, at 151 (citing U.S.S.G. §§ 5B1.1-5G1.3).
148
Id.; see also id. at 152 n.47 (“A judge’s power to depart from a sentencing range
is carefully circumscribed under the Guidelines and departure is strictly reviewed at
the appellate level. But see United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1309 (2nd Cir.
1993) (advocating departure based on offender characteristics because ‘departure in
the appropriate case is essential to the satisfactory functioning of the sentencing
system’”)).
149
Id. at 152.
150
See Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years, supra note 3; see also United
States v. Weld, 619 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2015).
151
See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in A Post-Booker Federal
Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 693 (2006).
152
Weld, 619 F. App’x at 513.
145
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Responsibilities,” Section 5K2.20 “Aberrant Behavior,” and Section
3E1.1 “Acceptance of Responsibility.”153
Scholars contend that it is appropriate to consider gender in
sentencing cases, but not to enhance penalties for non-violent drugaddicted mothers, which only serves to keep mothers away from their
children, and further reduce chances of getting sober and obtaining
future employment.154 The Guidelines make an “effort to produce
identical sentences for males and females who commit similar
crimes;” however, this has never been successful. 155 Instead, it
imposes excessive and oppressive “costs on families as well as women
who do not resemble the violent male drug dealers who inspired the
severe federal drug penalties.” 156
Therefore, “gender-related
differences can play a legitimate role in sentencing.”157 Because “by
ignoring the gendered realities of caregiving,” a completely genderneutral sentencing scheme “has the potential of increasing
intergenerational crime.”158
V. JUDGE VARLAN’S UNFOUNDED INTERPRETATION OF THE
GUIDELINES IN WELD
Judge Varlan’s imposition of an enhanced sentence in Weld’s
case was inappropriate.
Applying the child endangerment
enhancement of “substantial risk of harm to a minor” to a woman
charged with manufacturing meth is bad policy because it conflicts
with important constitutional values, and it improperly interprets the
Guidelines purported principles. While substantial risk of harm to a
minor has been a permissible child endangerment enhancement in
other contexts, as a matter of interpretation, it should not apply to
Lacey Weld.
The United States Code guides judges by providing that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of . . .
agencies of the United States, the words “person,”
“human being,” “child,” and “individual,” shall include
every infant member of the species homo sapiens who

153

See Raeder, supra note 151, at 717-18, 737-38.
See generally id. at 692 (arguing that downward deviations based on gender can
and should be appropriate for mothers).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. (emphasis added).
158
Id.
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is born alive at any stage of development.159
The U.S.C. goes on to describe “born alive,” which was clearly not at
issue in this case because the fetus was still in Weld’s womb.160
Additionally, the U.S.C. states, in pertinent part, that the section
quoted above shall not “be construed to affirm, deny, or expand any
legal status or legal right applicable to any member of the species
homo sapiens at any point prior to being ‘born alive.’”161 Here, fetuses
are clearly not accounted for, as they are not a person, human being,
child, or individual under the letter of the law.162 Therefore, applying
the substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor enhancement is
inappropriate.
Section 2D1.1(b) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines provides for an increase of six offense levels when the
defendant engages in the manufacture of methamphetamine and
creates a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor or an
incompetent. 163 In determining whether the offense created a
substantial risk of harm to human life, the court may consider factors
such as the quantity of chemicals found in the laboratory, manor in
which the toxic substances were disposed of, duration of the offense,
extent of the manufacturing operation, and location of the
laboratory.164
Here, then, the question becomes whether a fetus is a minor or
an incompetent for the purposes of sentencing. In Section 2D1.1,
“incompetent” is defined as “an individual who is incapable of taking
care of the individual’s self or property because of a mental or physical
illness or disability, mental retardation, or senility.”165 This clearly
does not apply to a fetus, as a fetus is not an individual lacking the
capacity to care for itself due to “mental or physical illness, disability,
mental retardation, or senility.” 166 Thus, for the purposes of
159

1 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2015).
Id. § 8(b) (defining “born alive” as “the complete expulsion or extraction from his
or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such expulsion
or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or
definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord
has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result
of natural or induced labor, cesarean section, or induced abortion”).
161
Id. § 8(c).
162
See id. § 8(a)-(c).
163
18 U.S.C.S. App’x § 2D1.1(b)(13)(D) (LEXIS through PL 114-115).
164
18 U.S.C.S. App’x § 608(b)(1)(B) (LEXIS through PL 114-114) (explaining that
the provisions include substantial risk of harm to the environment as well as to a
minor or incompetent).
165
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. 18(B)(ii) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
166
Id.
160
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sentencing, a fetus does not meet the definition of “an incompetent.”167
The Guidelines go on to define “minor” as:
(A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18
years; (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not, who
a law enforcement officer represented to a participant
(i) had not attained the age of 18 years, and (ii) could be
provided for the purposes of engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or (C) an undercover law enforcement
officer who represented to a participant that the officer
had not attained the age of 18 years.168
Is a fetus an individual who has not attained the age of eighteen years?
Merriam-Webster defines minor as a “person who is not yet old
enough to have the rights of an adult.”169 Based on these definitions, a
fetus is arguably not a person or an individual and, therefore, not a
minor. Allowing a fetus to be classified as a minor creates de facto
fetal personhood, which has been explicitly prohibited by the laws of
this country.170 The legal status of fetuses is hotly contested and
allowing laws designed to protect minors, people not old enough to
have the rights of adults, to extend to fetuses would create policy
problems and alienate much of the population.
Fortunately, however, existing case law can provide guidance
and avoid these pitfalls. In United States v. Carney, the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense 500
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine,” and carrying a firearm in furtherance of
the crime. 171 Carney was sentenced using a six-level sentencing
enhancement pursuant to Section § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C) of the Guidelines,
and he appealed.172 The appellate court held that the substantial risk of
harm to the life of a minor enhancement did not “apply whenever
manufacture of meth[] caused a substantial risk of any type of harm to
a minor,” but rather, the sentencing enhancement required “a type of
harm that could cause death or serious injury that would adversely
affect the life of a minor.”173
“Carney argue[d] that the phrase ‘harm to the life of a minor’
167

Id.
U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 cmt. 1.
169
Minor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minor
(last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
170
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (explaining that because abortion is
legal, fetuses cannot have personhood status, or abortions would be criminalized as
murder).
171
United States v. Carney, 117 F. App’x 928, 929 (5th Cir. 2004).
172
Id. at 929.
173
Id. at 930-31 (emphasis added).
168
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contemplates serious harm, not just any harm.”174 “[T]he government
argued that the words ‘to the life’ are inconsequential surplusage.”175
On appeal, the court held that “[t]he district court simply erred by
dismissing the words ‘to the life’ when interpreting the guideline[s],”
noting that “Congress chose the specific words” to carry meaning.176
Following the rules of statutory construction, the court noted that “the
plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language” must be
followed and that the statute must “be construed . . . [so] that every
word has some operative effect.”177
The appellate court concluded that “[i]f Congress had intended
for § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C) to apply whenever the manufacture of
methamphetamine caused a substantial risk of any type of harm to a
minor, then it would have passed a law that said ‘substantial risk of
harm to a minor.’”178 However, Congress instead “passed a law that
requires a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor.”179 The
inclusion of “‘to the life’ indicates that Congress wanted to punish
situations in which children faced a substantial risk of serious harm, as
opposed to any type of harm.”180 Therefore, “[h]arm ‘to the life of a
minor’ suggests a type of harm that could cause death or a serious
injury that would adversely affect the life of a minor.”181
Carney can be applied to Weld’s case. As discussed above, the
harm that Weld may have exposed her fetus to, in the manufacturing
of meth, is not the type of harm that would “cause death or serious
injury that would adversely affect the life of a minor.”182 Indeed,
Weld’s son was born alive, and although he suffered severe
withdrawal symptoms,183 the symptoms are unlikely to persist or affect
his health in the future.

174

Id. at 930.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Carney, 117 F. App’x at 930. (citing United States v. Kay, 59 F.3d 738, 742 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.; see also Letter from Doctors, Scientists, & Specialists, supra note 51 (“In
utero physiologic dependence on opiates (not addiction), known as Neonatal
Narcotic Abstinence Syndrome, is readily diagnosable and treatable, but no such
symptoms have been found to occur following prenatal cocaine or methamphetamine
exposure.”).
183
Lacey Weld Sentenced to More Than 12 Years, supra note 3 (explaining that the
baby “suffered from withdrawals for almost six weeks”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing judges to consider pregnancy when sentencing drugaddicted women is another mechanism for devaluation and
suppression. This creates ex post facto law and fetal personhood,
whose life is valued higher than that of its mother— a judicial fiat.
Fetuses are not minors within the meaning of the Guidelines, and even
if a judge were to interpret the word “minor” to include fetuses, the
harm caused by in-utero meth exposure does not warrant the use of the
“substantial risk of harm to a minor” enhancement. Keeping women
away from their children and families not only makes them wards of
the state, it also leaves the government to support the families on the
outside. Additionally, prisons fail to offer the treatment programs that
these women need to become competent mothers and contributing
members of society.
As evidenced above, the enhanced sentences are
counterproductive. Judges should not have the discretion to enhance a
pregnant drug user’s sentence beyond what was explicitly permitted by
Congress. Treatment, including early intervention and rehabilitative
services, is what states should utilize to address the problem of drugexposed newborns.
Using the child endangerment enhancement in the Guidelines
to justify harsher sentences for pregnant women, while not strictly
unconstitutional, nevertheless implicates constitutional rights to
privacy and personal autonomy, fosters racism, and impedes the goal
of healthy families. Criminally prosecuting pregnant drug-addicted
women creates a conflict between women’s rights to privacy and
personal autonomy, the rights of fetuses to physical integrity, and the
right of the state to protect potential human life.
As seen in Judge Varlan’s decision, there is a state interest in
protecting potential human life, and prosecutors are using criminal
sanctions to protect the physical integrity of fetuses and justify
punishment of pregnant women. However, the results of these
prosecutions are counter to the state’s goal. The effect is the
unjustified subordination of women and denial of constitutional
guarantees.

